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kenberg, on 2015-April-25, 07:09, said:
This is interesting from several perspectives. The economics, certainly. But also the trouble that arises when we start calling people names. :Charlatans and Cranks" was in the first edition of his text but was removed for the second edition by demand ot the publisher, and Mankiw now agrees. And Bernstein writes "Economists sometimes serve vested interests, and will change their views accordingly. The best example is also one of the best economists, Greg Mankiw.".. If you go to the link and read the follow-up conversation between the two, Bernstein expresses surprise that Manikw took offense by this"Having read your website reacting to my TPM post, you and your readers got me all wrong. I certainly didn't accuse you of hypocrisy and meant no offense at all. In fact, I called you one of the best economists, and have always enjoyed your work, " Uh huh.Well, I can see why Manikw did not take Bernstein's words as a compliment. Being called a really talented prostitute is, at best, a mixed compliment.
The Art of Controversy by Arthur Shopenhauer has an entertaining and useful discussion of ad hominem and ad personam arguments:
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Another trick is to use arguments ad hominem, or ex concessis* When your opponent makes a proposition, you must try to see whether it is not in some way if needs be, only apparently inconsistent with some other proposition which he has made or admitted, or with the principles of a school or sect which he has commended and approved, or with the actions of those who support the sect, or else of those who give it only an apparent and spurious support, or with his own actions or want of action. For example, should he defend suicide, you may at once exclaim, Why dont you hang yourself? Should he maintain that Berlin is an unpleasant place to live in, you may say, Why dont you leave by the first train? Some such claptrap is always possible.
* The truth from which I draw my proof may he either (1) of an objective and universally valid character; in that case my proof is veracious, secundum veritatem; and it is such proof alone that has any genuine validity. Or (2) it may be valid only for the person to whom I wish to prove my proposition, and with whom I am disputing. He has, that is to say, either taken up some position once for all as a prejudice, or hastily admitted it in the course of the dispute; and on this I ground my proof. In that case, it is a proof valid only for this particular man, ad hominem. I compel my opponent to grant my proposition, but I fail to establish it as a truth of universal validity. My proof avails for my opponent alone, but for no one else. For example, if my opponent is a devotee of Kants, and I ground my proof on some utterance of that philosopher, it is a proof which in itself is only ad hominem. If he is a Mohammedan, I may prove my point by reference to a passage in the Koran, and that is sufficient for him; but here it is only a proof ad hominem.
* The truth from which I draw my proof may he either (1) of an objective and universally valid character; in that case my proof is veracious, secundum veritatem; and it is such proof alone that has any genuine validity. Or (2) it may be valid only for the person to whom I wish to prove my proposition, and with whom I am disputing. He has, that is to say, either taken up some position once for all as a prejudice, or hastily admitted it in the course of the dispute; and on this I ground my proof. In that case, it is a proof valid only for this particular man, ad hominem. I compel my opponent to grant my proposition, but I fail to establish it as a truth of universal validity. My proof avails for my opponent alone, but for no one else. For example, if my opponent is a devotee of Kants, and I ground my proof on some utterance of that philosopher, it is a proof which in itself is only ad hominem. If he is a Mohammedan, I may prove my point by reference to a passage in the Koran, and that is sufficient for him; but here it is only a proof ad hominem.
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A last trick is to become personal, insulting, rude, as soon as you perceive that your opponent has the upper hand, and that you are going to come off worst. It consists in passing from the subject of dispute, as from a lost game, to the disputant himself, and in some way attacking his person. It may be called the argumentum ad personam, to distinguish it from the argumentum ad hominem, which passes from the objective discussion of the subject pure and simple to the statements or admissions which your opponent has made in regard to it. But in becoming personal you leave the subject altogether, and turn your attack to his person, by remarks of an offensive and spiteful character. It is an appeal from the virtues of the intellect to the virtues of the body, or to mere animalism. This is a very popular trick, because every one is able to carry it into effect; and so it is of frequent application. Now the question is, What counter-trick avails for the other party? for if he has recourse to the same rule, there will be blows, or a duel, or an action for slander.
It would be a great mistake to suppose that it is sufficient not to become personal yourself. For by showing a man quite quietly that he is wrong, and that what he says and thinks is incorrect a process which occurs in every dialectical victory you embitter him more than if you used some rude or insulting expression. Why is this? Because, as Hobbes observes,* all mental pleasure consists in being able to compare oneself with others to ones own advantage. Nothing is of greater moment to a man than the gratification of his vanity, and no wound is more painful than that which is inflicted on it. Hence such phrases as Death before dishonour, and so on. The gratification of vanity arises mainly by comparison of oneself with others, in every respect, but chiefly in respect of ones intellectual powers; and so the most effective and the strongest gratification of it is to be found in controversy. Hence the embitterment of defeat, apart from any question of injustice; and hence recourse to that last weapon, that last trick, which you cannot evade by mere politeness. A cool demeanour may, however, help you here, if, as soon as your opponent becomes personal, you quietly reply, That has no bearing on the point in dispute, and immediately bring the conversation back to it, and continue to show him that he is wrong, without taking any notice of his insults. Say, as Themistocles said to Eurybiades Strike, but hear me. But such demeanour is not given to every one.
* Elementa philosophica de Cive.
As a sharpening of wits, controversy is often, indeed, of mutual advantage, in order to correct ones thoughts and awaken new views. But in learning and in mental power both disputants must be tolerably equal. If one of them lacks learning, he will fail to understand the other, as he is not on the same level with his antagonist. If he lacks mental power, he will be embittered, and led into dishonest tricks, and end by being rude.
The only safe rule, therefore, is that which Aristotle mentions in the last chapter of his Topica: not to dispute with the first person you meet, but only with those of your acquaintance of whom you know that they possess sufficient intelligence and self-respect not to advance absurdities; to appeal to reason and not to authority, and to listen to reason and yield to it; and, finally, to cherish truth, to be willing to accept reason even from an opponent, and to be just enough to bear being proved to be in the wrong, should truth lie with him. From this it follows that scarcely one man in a hundred is worth your disputing with him. You may let the remainder say what they please, for every one is at liberty to be a fool desipere est jus gentium. Remember what Voltaire says: La paix vaut encore mieux que la vérité**. Remember also an Arabian proverb which tells us that on the tree of silence there hangs its fruit, which is peace.
It would be a great mistake to suppose that it is sufficient not to become personal yourself. For by showing a man quite quietly that he is wrong, and that what he says and thinks is incorrect a process which occurs in every dialectical victory you embitter him more than if you used some rude or insulting expression. Why is this? Because, as Hobbes observes,* all mental pleasure consists in being able to compare oneself with others to ones own advantage. Nothing is of greater moment to a man than the gratification of his vanity, and no wound is more painful than that which is inflicted on it. Hence such phrases as Death before dishonour, and so on. The gratification of vanity arises mainly by comparison of oneself with others, in every respect, but chiefly in respect of ones intellectual powers; and so the most effective and the strongest gratification of it is to be found in controversy. Hence the embitterment of defeat, apart from any question of injustice; and hence recourse to that last weapon, that last trick, which you cannot evade by mere politeness. A cool demeanour may, however, help you here, if, as soon as your opponent becomes personal, you quietly reply, That has no bearing on the point in dispute, and immediately bring the conversation back to it, and continue to show him that he is wrong, without taking any notice of his insults. Say, as Themistocles said to Eurybiades Strike, but hear me. But such demeanour is not given to every one.
* Elementa philosophica de Cive.
As a sharpening of wits, controversy is often, indeed, of mutual advantage, in order to correct ones thoughts and awaken new views. But in learning and in mental power both disputants must be tolerably equal. If one of them lacks learning, he will fail to understand the other, as he is not on the same level with his antagonist. If he lacks mental power, he will be embittered, and led into dishonest tricks, and end by being rude.
The only safe rule, therefore, is that which Aristotle mentions in the last chapter of his Topica: not to dispute with the first person you meet, but only with those of your acquaintance of whom you know that they possess sufficient intelligence and self-respect not to advance absurdities; to appeal to reason and not to authority, and to listen to reason and yield to it; and, finally, to cherish truth, to be willing to accept reason even from an opponent, and to be just enough to bear being proved to be in the wrong, should truth lie with him. From this it follows that scarcely one man in a hundred is worth your disputing with him. You may let the remainder say what they please, for every one is at liberty to be a fool desipere est jus gentium. Remember what Voltaire says: La paix vaut encore mieux que la vérité**. Remember also an Arabian proverb which tells us that on the tree of silence there hangs its fruit, which is peace.
** Peace is better than the truth; I hardly knew neither one nor the other in this world.
